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Abstract
Challenges to post-conflict leadership in African states highlight the need for 
democratic capacity building, with clear participatory processes involving 
communities and the leadership as a necessary condition to mitigate new 
or resurrected conflicts. This article explores transformational leadership 
and how it relates to democratic capacity building in Rwanda. We argue that 
community capacity building through grassroots leadership is a necessary and 
sufficient ingredient for the development and sustenance of democracy in post-
conflict societies. Reconciliation through justice, political reforms including 
decentralisation, and women’s empowerment as critical variables in this 
process characterise a transformational agenda to gradually achieve stability 
at the grassroots. Despite dilemmas of justice and democracy, transformative 
leadership in Rwanda continues to evolve at both state and grassroots levels 
through processes based on indigenous knowledge and practices like gacaca 
and ingando to achieve the greater good of reconciliation.
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Gardner (1990:1) defines leadership as ‘the process of persuasion or example 
by which an individual induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader 
or shared by the leader and his or her followers’. In the African context, it 
was often the case that post-independence national leadership was of the 
so-called ‘big man’ style. In this form of leadership, decision making over the 
distribution of resources, power, and authority was (and still is to a limited 
extent) exclusively controlled by the president. To the extent that objectives 
were participatory, state leaders mainly involved a tightly controlled group of 
political elites. 
In the dawn of the 21st century, the emerging African paradigm reflects a need 
for democratic capacity building – one that invites diverse communities into a 
participatory process with leadership. When we speak of diverse communities, 
we address not so much ethnographic communities (although these are 
relevant) as we do class communities – in the knowledge that class divisions 
on the continent create resource-controlling elites. In this context, inter-ethnic 
grassroots communities remain disenfranchised, becoming the source of new 
or resurrected conflicts.
If the 21st century African leader (and here we flatten the definition to include 
a range of leadership at different levels in society) is to stimulate democratic 
capacity building in communities, this individual must first learn the process 
of managing or mitigating conflict to build a community’s capacity for 
sustainable peace and development. Burns (1978) recognised that leadership 
emerges in response to conflict. Indeed, one could argue that conflict gives 
depth and perspective to leadership.1 In the African context, this refers not 
only to the typically understood intra-state conflict, but to the proliferation 
of conflict taking place at the local level as well. Conflict is a catalytic agent 
1 There is a number of examples where leadership has created conflict so as to sustain 
themselves in their positions. Our focus here is not conflict manipulation by leadership 
for self-serving ends. Our interest is in examining leadership who see conflict as an 
opportunity to raise the consciousness and epistemology of a society.
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for transformation, and conflict mitigation is the tool that negotiates this 
transformation. 
In this article we explore the nature of transformational African leadership in 
relation to democratic capacity building, focusing on Paul Kagame, President 
of Rwanda. We begin with a broad view of African democracy and of how 
leadership has shaped this phenomenon to respond to the needs of the political 
state. Then, exemplifying Rwanda, we move to an argument that community 
capacity building through grassroots leadership is a necessary and sufficient 
ingredient for the development and sustenance of African democracy. To do so, 
transformational leadership must exist at various levels of the state in order to 
mobilise community consciousness. We look at reconciliation through justice, 
political reforms including decentralisation, and women’s empowerment as 
critical variables in this process, noting the conditions of implementation that 
create space for levels of leadership to execute a transformational agenda. In 
doing so, we comment on the tension between justice and democracy and the 
dilemma these two political concepts pose for a transformational leader such 
as Paul Kagame.
Lederach (1997:38–39) provides a model of how one can examine leadership at 
various levels, ranging from top level to leadership at the grassroots. Lederach 
envisions three levels of leadership. At the top (Level 1) are the regime elites, 
politicians, religious leaders, and the military who engage in highly visible 
negotiations at the state level. At Level 2, Lederach locates intellectuals, ethnic 
leadership, regional or local religious leaders, and heads of recognised non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). These are individuals who are most 
likely to be engaged in negotiations with Level 1 over the implementation of 
national policy. Such was the case in Rwanda where individuals who headed up 
humanitarian organisations were involved with Level 1 in the implementation 
of gacaca and ingando programmes, as part of the national reconciliation 
programme. We will be discussing this at length later in the paper. Level 3 is 
where the grassroots leadership resides. Here we find indigenous community 
leaders of one sort or another who tend to be engaged in the struggle for 
bringing more resources to their local population. Of course, these are not 
rigid divisions. In some post-conflict developing countries there is mobility 
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as some Level 2 actors will be pulled into Level 1 and Level 3 actors can move 
to Level 2.
While Lederach’s attention is focused on third party interventional analysis, 
his model becomes an excellent vehicle to describe the gap between how 
democracy is interpreted and how transformative leadership evolves at the 
state and the grassroots level. We do this via a case study of Rwanda, showing 
how transformational leadership following the 1994 genocide is stimulating 
community capacity building. In Rwanda, democracy, rather than remaining 
in the realm of abstract ideas, takes on a practical function of helping the state 
to survive. 
African transformational leadership
Gardner (1990) distinguishes between transactional leadership and 
transformational leadership. In transactional leadership, a leader engages in 
an exchange process. As Koerner and Bunkers (1994:71) note in citing Burns 
(1978), there is an ‘exchange of valued things’. The leadership process is 
essentially deal-making guided by the satisfaction of mutual interests through 
distributive gains. In the classic negotiations schema, this works well when 
both parties enjoy a rough symmetry of power. However, in many intra-
state interactions involving regime and local actors, this is not the case. In 
the African context, transactional leadership often becomes the fulcrum for 
tension and unrest, leading to conflict.2
Distinctively, Burns (1978:20) notes that transformational leadership occurs 
‘when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and 
followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and reality’. In this 
way, transformational leadership involves innovation, change, growth, and 
empowerment of self and others. Characteristic of this form of leadership, 
community leaders and followers have similar objectives and needs. A mutual 
sense of security, identity, recognition, development, and self-actualisation 
shape the contours of negotiation for change. 
2 Note the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
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In the African context, it is not possible to talk about transformational 
leadership divorced from the emergence of democracy. African democracy has 
been developing since the early 1990s although its transition from dictatorial, 
‘big man’ regimes has been erratic. The current positional jockeying for power 
in Zimbabwe stands as a good example. Guinea Bissau and Gabon provide two 
more examples of democracy being thwarted by authoritarianism. Having said 
that, there can be little argument that a ‘second independence’ (Joseph 1997) is 
moving cautiously through the continent. The hallmark of this transition, of 
course, was the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 after 27 years in prison and 
the negotiated end to the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
Guiding the modern African state can be framed as a tension between 
constitutional democracy and utilitarian democracy. The latter is where 
democracy is interpreted and implemented on the ground in local 
communities. Utilitarianism can trace its origins to early Greek thought, but 
the first modernist expression came from Jeremy Bentham who had the idea 
that the morality of a social contract between a government and its people 
was determined by whether it provided ‘the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people’ (Ebenstein and Ebenstein 1991:596). John Stuart Mill, a 
libertarian, advanced this philosophic principle, pointing out that the state 
was no greater than the individuals who composed it (Ebenstein and Ebenstein 
1991:630). From this perspective, the normative value of democracy cannot 
be taken for granted, but depends on the way democracy is utilised. Thus, 
the ethic of procedural equality comes into play. Procedural equality is about 
the distribution of scarce resources and decision-making across competing 
groups, but more importantly, it is about power. As Key (1958:5) put it, power 
‘… [is] fundamentally of relationships of superordination and subordination, 
of dominance and submission, and the governors and the governed’. Thus, 
utilitarian democracy has as one of its chief objectives the distribution of state 
power away from dominance by elites at Level 1 in the Lederach model to 
greater inclusivity of actors at Levels 2 and 3 (grassroots). Conflict resolution 
has the potential for levelling the power playing field by giving visibility to 
narratives embedded in local communities that are essential to the resolution 
of conflict and the implementation of procedural democracy.
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Brief background on Rwanda
The 1994 civil war and accompanying genocide devastated the country, with 
an unprecedented death toll of close to one million Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus, leaving thousands of orphans, disabled people, and widows. Half the 
population fled the country including professionals, and 80% of domesticated 
animals were killed. Political and economic structures and infrastructures had 
to be restarted. In a country with more than 85% of the population living in 
abject poverty, approximately 3,5 million refugee returnees and more than one 
third of households headed by females or orphans were threatened by HIV/
AIDS partly because of widespread rape. However, the extent of achievement 
in transforming relationships, institutions and communities following the 
genocide presents a learning opportunity on the nature and role of leadership 
capacities in transcending selfish and short-term goals, towards a higher order 
of collective gain and national stability. Many post-civil war countries continue 
to struggle to determine this role, and how leadership capacities interact with 
attitudes and institutions in such a setting to cause the desired transformation. 
Daunting challenges of national reconstruction and reconciliation in post-
genocide Rwanda persist, and many gains have not come without contest 
and discontent from various political circles within and outside the country. 
Central to this debate is the tension between constitutional democracy as 
enacted by African state elites and preferred in the broader international 
community,3 and what as we noted earlier can be called utilitarian democracy, 
which is people-oriented and seeks to involve grassroots leadership in a more 
inclusive and participatory manner. As a constitutional democracy, Anastase 
(2005) notes that Rwanda, throughout its constitutional history, never had a 
constitution responding to its own expectations as a nation, but often copied 
the constitutions of foreign countries. In doing so, the realities of political life 
as played out by the majority were ignored to satisfy the interests of the few. 
3 Constitutional democracies are based on an inherent presumption of stability. In the 
African context, this model frequently produced a fraudulent electoral process that 
sustained a ruling regime. See Kalu 2009:9–39.
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In May 2003, 90% of Rwanda’s citizens supported a new constitution for 
their country, which was eventually promulgated in June 2004. As Anastase 
further noted, the new constitution was guided by the country's context 
and challenges. It aims to create equitable power sharing, establish the rule 
of law to improve people’s social justice and welfare, and establish a pluralist 
democratic system. It further seeks to combat the ideology of genocide in its 
various manifestations and to eradicate identity-based divisions by promoting 
national unity, ethnic and gender equality of all Rwandans, and engage in the 
quest for solutions through dialogue and social consensus. 
As noted above, utilitarian democracy takes this approach further, viewing 
these aims through state actions that add value to the quality of life and 
maximise the effectiveness of systems and institutions to meet the needs 
of its citizens. Equally, a number of transformations and reforms involving 
community, civil society and national level stakeholders and other actors in 
Rwanda reflect a dominant utilitarian approach to leadership and progress in 
the country. According to a 2005–2007 Social Cohesion survey conducted by 
the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), 97% of those 
who responded from all 416 administrative sectors in Rwanda agreed that the 
government is doing its best to improve the standards of living. Institutional 
and policy reforms, aided by various conflict resolution approaches have helped 
to bring about a closer relationship between the two forms of democracy. 
While time will be the final arbiter, it is possible to say that Kagame has been 
comparatively successful in managing the tension between the two forms of 
democracy – in contrast with many other African countries. We can think of 
this as a politics of incorporation where political pluralism takes the form of 
ongoing negotiations. This is particularly notable considering that in the past 
decade, the country has moved from short-term recovery to more long-term 
and strategic macroeconomic stabilisation and diversification, decentralised 
governance and other extensive reform initiatives in remarkable proportions 
(Kanyarukiga et al. 2006).
While there are claims of increasing authoritarianism on the part of government, 
the leadership in Rwanda can be perceived as progressively developmental, 
moving steadily (albeit with a few hic-ups) on a path to sustainable long-term 
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development (Hayman 2007). The 2007 Social Cohesion survey also showed 
that the majority of Rwandans believed in the effectiveness of the central 
government, with 56% of respondents agreeing that decisions that affect 
communities should be left to the government. 
Dorman (2006), explaining ‘post-liberation’ state behaviour, outlines 
characteristics that are applicable to Rwanda despite a history of violence, 
namely, amongst others: a strong government, introduction of distinctive 
institutional reforms, and rebuilding the nation with emphasis on security 
and national unity. While the methodology has invoked criticism from some 
quarters, the issue is whether Kagame’s leadership bears utilitarian qualities 
that have translated into additional value in service delivery and the quality 
of life among the citizenry. For example, according to the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), Rwanda is working 
within a structured development framework towards a long-term vision via 
a poverty reduction strategy bolstered by a strong political commitment from 
the government (Kanyarukiga et al. 2006).
Genocide experiences provide the over-arching framework within which all 
these efforts take place and its legacy predisposes some of the priorities in 
the country’s policy processes. Underneath, as Evans et al. (2005) note, is a 
leadership considered to be genuine in its commitment to socio-economic 
development as well as good governance, even if it diverges in some respects 
from western norms. 
Following, we exemplify transformational leadership and utilitarian democracy 
by discussing how Rwanda approaches political reforms, reconciliatory 
justice, and women’s empowerment. While these do not suggest the absence 
of inter-group differences in a post-conflict setting, they contribute greatly to 
socio-political transformations necessary for peace and reconciliation.
Political reforms
Post-conflict political reforms are critical to restore integrity, stability 
and reconciliation. Reform creates the opportunity for new roles and 
responsibilities to emerge and challenge various aspects of the preceding 
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political order. Webley (2004) highlights the ongoing debate that locates 
Rwanda’s predisposition to the 1994 genocide in different political orders in 
the country’s history, for instance, the pre-colonial conquest of Hutus and 
Twa by Tutsi, European colonial rule and state structure, and the pre-genocide 
government of Habyarimana blamed for the collapse of the 1994 Arusha 
Accord. Mamdani (2001) argues that these different orders have over the 
years been more often defined in terms of power struggles to access political 
and economic opportunities. Political reform in Rwanda has emphasised 
transformation of systems and structures to expand political inclusion, 
especially through political party activity, and decentralisation of power 
through local governments to communities. According to the 2007 survey, 
91% of Rwandans believed that they take part in decisions that affect them 
through established political processes.
Decentralisation of governance (decision-making, fiscal and financial 
planning and management) to provincial and local levels, and multiparty 
politics are some of the major political reforms in the country. Respectively, 
they both engage levels 1, 2 and 3 in the Lederach model and combine two 
other theoretical models that support this approach to power-sharing in 
ethnically segmented societies: the consociation model (Lijphart 1968, 1977), 
and the integrative model (Horowitz 1985). Lijphart emphasises the need for 
proportionality in government and segmented autonomy in combination with 
a high degree of self-governance (decentralisation). Horowitz also suggests 
dispersion of territorial power to take the heat off of a single focal point, and 
policies to promote moderation, such as electoral laws that encourage pre-
election coalitions and alliances in a multiparty setting. Both approaches seem 
to draw on the logic of ‘contact hypothesis’ (Allport 1954, Brewer 2000), the 
idea that prejudice and discrimination can be reduced by contact between 
parties under conditions that promote equal status. Political reforms in 
Rwanda seem to reflect these theoretical models through decentralisation and 
political pluralism. 
In 2001, Rwanda held the first local government elections, under the new 
policy to decentralise governance. Among those elected nationally were 
2 765 local council representatives, 106 town and district mayors, and an 
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additional 424 new town and district executives. The real achievement of the 
electoral process was the fact that a new leadership was identified at all levels 
of society and elected. The process of decentralisation has been instituted 
with numerous adjustments. These include the formation of Community 
Development Committees (CDCs) and the Rwanda Association of Local 
Government Authorities (RALGA) to oversee and advise on decentralisation 
and other policies, and conduct training to improve leadership and decision-
making capacities at the local level. Decentralisation also remains the principal 
gateway for citizens to decide and elect leaders of their preference and influence 
agendas for local governance and development. Local governments now 
undertake growth and development work previously handled by the central 
government, including access to education, health, poverty alleviation, dispute 
resolution, local elections, and other social and institutional programmes.
The challenges to decentralisation of governance notwithstanding, the 2005–
2007 Social Cohesion survey showed that ‘70%–85% of respondents agreed 
that the decision-making bodies created through decentralized processes are 
knowledgeable, autonomous in their decision making and work well together’. 
Further, many agree that decentralisation has contributed to an improvement 
of civil society. For example, 41% of respondents belong to saving and 
credit associations. This has not come without discontent from the political 
opposition and allies of the Hutu rebels, now reorganised in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Still, decentralisation of power to local governments 
presents a transformative opportunity that seeks to unite the country, with a 
large portion of the population that has remained traumatised.
Kagame’s resoluteness, given the need to rid the country of conditions that 
occasioned genocide, has been most visible in reforms to expand space for 
political participation while guarding against any recourse to pre-genocidal 
and genocidal practices. Unlike the traditional majoritarian ‘winner-takes-all’ 
approach to governance, Andrew England (2006) reports that Rwanda’s politics 
runs on a consensual basis, with all parties represented in government, and 
according to the 2003 constitution, even the party with a majority of deputies 
cannot hold more than 50% of cabinet posts. Fluid as it may appear, such 
increased inclusiveness and participation in decision-making processes and 
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implementation of programmes in which communities have specific needs are 
central to stability in post-conflict societies. 
The government is also changing genocidal narratives at the national and 
grassroots levels, focusing on ethnic cooperation and unity, including efforts 
to make the whole population trilingual in Kinyarwanda, French and English. 
Kanyarukiga et al. (2006) have argued that this will ultimately help Rwanda 
to overcome historical linguistic and cultural divides, central to the country’s 
power and ethnic conflicts. The government’s anti-segregation (‘Barwanda’) 
policy underscores this initiative, designed to head off attempts to divide the 
population along ethnic lines that could threaten a return to genocide. 
Many argue that ethnicity in Rwanda is more about class than language 
and cultural identity, largely because Rwandans are indistinguishable. Yet 
these factors are central in the debate seeking to locate predispositions that 
occasioned such a violent history, and efforts to defuse them. The above 
political developments, still unfolding, have facilitated individuals, families 
and communities to participate in judicial and women’s empowerment 
processes and programmes, as critical aspects in transformational leadership 
and utilitarian democracy. However, it is paramount that Rwanda’s leadership 
at all levels need to de-construct associated conflict narratives, and construct a 
new discourse to guide the ongoing reconciliation and transformation. 
Reconciliation through justice
Through gacaca and ingando, the leadership tapped into indigenous customs 
and norms to complement traditional western models and mechanisms to 
achieve reconciliation through justice. Countries that have gone through 
devastating wars, for example, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia, often singled 
out perpetrators of crimes and violence on the assumption that justice is done 
by apprehending them. As Hayman (2007) argued, from the perspective of 
many, the transformation and reduction of tensions in Rwanda needed a 
pragmatic approach emphasising reconciliation, and working in concert with 
a retributive justice system favoured in western norms to bring key actors to 
trial. Rwanda’s approach has combined levels 1, 2 and 3 of the Lederach model, 
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drawing from international systems and norms to establish a National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) on the one hand, and a moderated 
local approach at the national/communal level through the gacaca and 
ingando systems on the other. Despite the unevenness of these mechanisms, 
many communities have experienced a measure of justice and reconciliation, 
without undermining mainstream western-based approaches to justice in 
post-conflict situations. 
Gacaca: Reconciliation and justice 
Endogenous mechanisms of justice, rooted in local community customs 
gain their preference in responding to local conflicts because they evolve and 
are practised for extended periods rather than being imposed or imported 
into societies (Zartman 2000:7). Lederach (1995:10) has also argued that 
‘understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of response 
necessarily needs to be rooted in [the ethnology of a community] and must 
respect and draw from the cultural knowledge of a people’. The government 
decision to formalise, moderate and improve gacaca highlights level 3 of 
the model as a major component of justice and reconciliatory processes 
across communities. 
‘Gacaca’ is originally a traditional community-based approach to dispute 
resolution, conducted by elders in predominantly informal settings on issues 
such as land, theft, marriage, and property. The practice has been in place 
in major parts of the country since pre-colonial days. In 2002, the Kagame 
regime adopted gacaca to try lesser crimes of genocide, as an additional layer 
to provide local justice and involve local communities in the reconciliation 
process. It operates alongside the national court system and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and at the local, sector, district and province 
levels of the society. The main feature of the system is the traditional weekly 
meetings. These serve as local courts, and have been used to handle a number 
of genocide related cases at the local level. Community members meet on a 
weekly basis to collectively consider cases and other issues of dispute in the 
96
WallaceWarfieldandAshadSentongo
community, to give evidence and testimony for the elected judges to render 
their judgement on the matter.
Intended to provide relief to an overwhelmed justice sector with thousands 
of prisoners who could potentially stand trial, gacaca became a visionary 
approach to draw grassroots communities into the work of the NURC, but 
also complement other national efforts to address the legacies of genocide. To 
date, the gacaca system celebrates its contribution to a high level of awareness 
about the rule of law at the grassroots, and justice through public testimonies 
and confessions. The Center for Communication Programs (2001) reported 
that 90% of the population knew about gacaca and the reconciliation process 
through election of judges, talk shows, sports competitions, music and drama, 
and the print media. According to the Social Cohesion survey (National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission 2008), 96% of survivors and 83% of prisoners 
believed the gacaca system was a better way of dealing with their cases than 
traditional courts as a way to eradicate impunity. Some NGOs have noted, 
however, that the real indicator of people’s response to and embrace of gacaca 
is not what they say to surveyors and pollsters, but whether they show up at the 
weekly gacaca meetings in their communities (Webley 2004). 
The system operates in 12 103 cell-level courts across the country, each 
conducted face-to-face by 169 442 inyangamugayo (persons of integrity) as 
judges elected by local communities and then trained by government (Huyse 
and Salter 2008:41). While the courts are criticised for lack of fair international 
trial standards, government argues that ‘their fairness could be ensured by the 
participation of the local population’ (Amnesty International 2010:12), yet 
they also helped to expedite delivery of justice in ways that the majority of 
the people understood and culturally identified with. From January 2006 to 
February 2007, a total of 71 405 were tried, 33 233 sentenced to prison, 16 438 
put on community service, 15 219 acquitted, and 72 000 appeals were dealt 
with (Huyse and Salter 2008:43). 
This bottom-up approach to redress the legacies of genocide has empowered 
grassroots leadership to take charge of the local reconciliation process (as 
they understand it), and offer better utility in moving victim communities 
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past their grief. Alana Tiemessen (2004) goes on to note that gacaca was 
resurrected because the cultural norms of international justice have proven 
to be inadequate to promote reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda, and 
critical support from the international community must generate a way of 
retaining gacaca’s indigeneity without serving the interests of political regimes 
or inciting ethnic tensions.
Ingando: A traditional reflective practice
Nantulya and Alexander (2005) report that ingando is a Rwandese traditional 
practice of immobilising regular activities to reflect and find solutions to 
communal challenges, and the re-integration of convicts into communities 
through special programmes. In pre-modern times, traditional kings, their 
armies and community leaders mobilised their subjects to come together and 
reflect on situations like wars, droughts, diseases and other calamities, and to 
find collective solutions. With support from the government, NURC revived 
the practice of ingando to engage convicts and communities in reconciliatory 
dialogue. As a complement to gacaca, the objective of ingando is to transform 
relationships from conflict into peaceful coexistence at individual and 
communal levels. Looked at from a utilitarian perspective, ingando has the 
capacity to address the greater good implicit in level 3 of the Lederach model. 
Initially, ingando participants retreated into residential programmes of 
between three weeks and two months, to reflect on their crimes and other 
atrocities and to commit themselves to ways of ensuring that crimes do not 
re-occur. Themes covered include analysis of Rwanda’s problems, history of 
Rwanda, political and socio-economic issues, rights, obligations, duties, and 
leadership. It is mandatory for prisoners to participate in this programme 
before they are released back into their communities. By 2005, 102 909 people 
(released prisoners, perpetrators, local and community leaders) have been 
trained (Nantulya and Alexander 2005). To date, the programme takes the 
form of civic education and has been extended countrywide to also include 
students, traders, women, youths, leaders and perpetrators of genocide and 
other crimes. NURC, working through local councils, schools and other 
community structures, provides logistics and other forms of support. 
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Approximately 3 000 students attend ingando retreats each year, mostly at the 
National Ingando Centre in Ruhengeri.
As integrative and indigenous mechanisms, gacaca and ingando demonstrate 
a unique perspective to approach leadership in post-conflict societies. They 
exemplify transformation and a utilitarian approach based on consilience or 
unification of knowledge (Wilson 1998:11), i.e. integrating state processes 
with local traditions to achieve local peace and national stability. The 
utilitarian value of the leadership in Rwanda manifests in the recognition 
of widely acceptable traditions and readily available local capacities. These 
are legislatively integrated within systems of the state and transformed into 
institutions to generate reconciliation and accelerate development, yet they 
remain culturally relevant and meaningful to the everyday life of people at 
communal level. Therefore, while gacaca takes a judicial approach to enable 
individuals and communities to account for crime and violations, ingando 
provides opportunities for reform and reintegration and the enabling 
environment for this to occur. 
Women’s empowerment
The social and political roles of women are critical to post-conflict stability 
and reconciliation. In Rwanda a number of women play prominent roles in 
judicial, reconciliation and reconstruction processes, which demonstrates a 
remarkable transformation and improvement in their status in the culture 
and institutions of the state. Powley (2004:5) explains that ‘genocide was 
committed most heavily upon men, and women by their demographic 
majority took on multiple responsibilities to rebuild their families and the 
society’. Many women played critical roles to organise new communities 
following the genocide, providing resources and other services to meet the 
needs of victims and survivors. Others single-handedly catered to the needs 
of families, and found homes for orphans. The restorative role of women 
in post-conflict Rwanda was (and still is) supported in part by public and 
private organisations. Most importantly at the policy level, the presence of 
many women within government ‘… has contributed to progressive gender 
policies within the administration’ (Powley 2004:7). Reflecting once again 
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on the Lederach model, women in Rwanda play critical roles at all levels 
of leadership. 
Historically, women have not faired well in constitutional democracies.4 The 
Schumpeterarian (Schumpeter 1950) emphasis on voting (until recently 
upheld in western democracies) has favoured the embedded power of 
men.5 As political actors at Level 1, Rwandan women play a central role in 
the governance, reconciliation and reconstruction of the country. They are 
constitutionally guaranteed 24 of the 80 deputies, and 30% of the senate. In 
the 2003 legislative elections, women won 40% of the seats in the chamber. By 
2007, there were 9 women in the 26-seat Senate and 38 women in the 80-seat 
Chamber of Deputies. Nine women also occupied cabinet positions. Extending 
the input of women in national, regional, and community administration, 
the country’s policy framework assures that as part of the decentralisation of 
power, one third of executive administrative positions in local government are 
held by women. To date, women occupy 56% of seats from the September 2008 
parliamentary elections (United Nations Development Fund for Women 2008). 
The potential for women’s political empowerment is supported by empirical 
data that show that as the representation of women increases in representative 
bodies, so does the legislation that speaks to their needs (Dowding, Godin 
and Pateman 2004:23). Joseph Sebarenzi, former Speaker of the Parliament, 
recognises that ‘gender representation in Rwanda is an undeniable fact and the 
government should be credited for it’ (Powley 2004:6). 
Strong perceptions that disfavour women persist however, and women remain 
vulnerable to the effects of poverty and other cultural and institutional 
arrangements that still favour males. Sexual and other forms of abuse and 
discrimination against women, entrenched over the years in social and 
cultural systems, continue to challenge the leadership in Rwanda especially 
when they are wrapped in silence. Many women still need to gain leadership 
experience after years of discrimination, to learn how to articulate their rights 
4 See, for example, Lipset 1990:188–189.
5 This was particularly true during the heyday of political machines in a number of cities in 
the United States. See, for example, Erie 1988.
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and opinions, and how to balance these roles as mothers or family heads faced 
with strong cultural obstacles. Drawing from Mamdani’s (2001) analysis of 
cultural and political identities in pre- and post-colonial Rwanda, there has 
been a remarkable transformation of social and political structures that in 
the past held women in Rwanda passive and insignificant. He states that in 
the past families and communities maintained a patriarchal approach to build 
social relationships and structure political institutions. The current outlook 
of women’s involvement in government and the roles they play at national, 
village and family levels demonstrate a leadership environment that had 
enabled transformation of such traditions to occur. 
To deal with taboos and other hindrances to women’s empowerment, a Ministry 
for Gender, and the National Women’s Council were set up in 1995 to ensure 
their participation even at the lowest village level of leadership (Umudugudu). 
This is evidenced even in critical sectors like security, where Powley (2004) 
reports that women have made great contributions. For example, in northern 
and northwestern Rwanda (Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, and Kibuye provinces), 
women have been instrumental in stabilising border communities, engaging 
rebels to return and reintegrate them in Rwandan society.
Critique
Critics question Kagame’s style of leadership, noting that it is tainted by the 
arrest and imprisonment of the former President and ally Pasteur Bizimungu, 
banning of political parties before 2003 elections, dominating the discourse 
about genocide to cover up atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF), and banning ethnically aligned political activities while 
maintaining a Tutsi dominated RPF Army and political party. Indeed, a hint 
of the dialectic haunts the leadership of Rwanda as it maintains a strong voice 
on its priorities and policies in areas where the government wants to achieve 
specific goals, all the while, pushing through political reforms and dialogue 
that eluded the political culture of Rwanda since independence. The 2008 
parliamentary elections were held under a coalition of political parties alleged 
to be allied to the RPF, because other opposition parties refused to participate 
claiming unlevelled political space. 
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Residual ethno-political tensions have resulted in administrative and 
organisational challenges that tend to undermine the reconciliatory value 
and cultural relevance of Kagame’s leadership style. Tiemessen  (2004) notes 
that the system, marred by ethnic tensions, and because of increasing state 
influence in the selection of judges and general administration, is viewed 
by many observers to serve and perpetuate Tutsi dominance and power, 
and silence dissenting voices against government. Particularly, the failure 
to prosecute alleged perpetrators from the ruling RFP continues to fuel 
allegations of Hutu witch-hunting, and many Hutus have fled into the DRC 
and other neighbouring countries claiming persecution. This has complicated 
the allocation of ‘victimhood’ in Rwanda based on genocide and post-genocide 
accounts from participants in the gacaca courts. It reinforces Lerche’s (2000) 
argument in post-conflict reconciliation that there are always competing 
narratives of victimhood, with all sides having their own version of the truth 
of ‘what really happened’. 
Conclusion
Transformative leadership is necessarily equated with what Greenstone and 
Peterson (1973) call orthodox liberalism: essentially, a broad redistribution 
of goods and services by the state. As we have noted in one way or another, 
transformative leadership has to balance constitutional democracy (often 
under pressure from international actors) with utilitarian democracy where 
needs and interests of grassroots leadership are stimulated. In this sense, 
transformative [political] leadership can be better described as pragmatic 
liberalism. Or putting it another way, pragmatic realism where procedural 
democracy (in this instance, the distribution of power) is occasionally sacrificed 
to produce the ‘greater good’. Here, the Kagame regime needs to be wary of 
undercutting the spirit of utilitarianism by centralising key decision making 
and creating an illusion of grassroots participation through implementation. 
The heart of the matter then, for the transformative leader attempting to 
establish the greater good in deep-rooted identity conflicts is reconciliation. 
The data on truth and reconciliation initiatives conducted after intra-state 
conflicts marked by opposing identity groups suggest that reconciliation is an 
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uneven process at best. As we noted above in the Rwanda scenario, victims’ 
sense of injustice does not always end at the conclusion of a gacaca hearing. 
Victims often experience expressions of regret and feel that entreaties for 
forgiveness are insincere. Or that the retributive justice calculus (where it is in 
place) does not match the atrocity of the crime. (Avruch and Vejarano 2002; 
Kriesberg 2003). 
In writing about the seemingly alchemic mixture that is producing Rwandan 
governance, our observations should not be taken as a prescription that sacrifices 
inherent values of constitutional democracy on the altar of pragmatic realism. 
Constitutional democracy should have a normative goal of responding to the 
needs of all who live within its reach. Our emphasis is on the transformative 
leader who acknowledges the tension, but also the opportunities existing in a 
broadly participatory political process. Such a leader values the role conflict 
mitigation can play in managing this tension and building a nation’s capacity 
for sustainable peace and development.
Sources
Allport, Gordon W. 1954. The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company.
Amnesty International 2010. Safer to stay silent: The chilling effect of Rwanda’s laws on 
‘genocide ideology’ and ‘sectarianism’ Index: AFR 47/005/2010. August 2010. London, 
Amnesty International. Available from: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
AFR47/005/2010/en>
Anastase, Shyaka 2005. The Rwanda conflict: Origin, development, exit strategies. A Study 
ordered by The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Available from: <http://
www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63:the-origin-of-
rwandan-conflict&catid=35:researches&Itemid=40> 
Avruch, Kevin and Beatriz Vejarano 2002. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A review 
essay and annotated bibliography. Social Justice, 2 (1–2), pp. 47–108. (Republished in 
The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 4 (2), Spring 2002. Available from: 
<http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/4_2recon.htm>)
Brewer, Marilynn B. 2000. Superordinate goals versus superordinate identity as bases of 
intergroup cooperation. In: Capozza, Dora and Rupert Brown eds. Social identity 
processes. London, Sage.
Burns, James McGregor 1978. Leadership. New York, Harper and Row.
103
Politicalleadershipandconflictresolution:AnAfricanexample
Center for Communication Programs 2001. Perceptions about the Gacaca Law in Rwanda: 
Evidence from a multi-method study. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University.
Dorman, S.R. 2006. Post-liberation politics in Africa: Examining the political legacy of struggle. 
Third World Quarterly, 27 (6), pp. 1085–1101.
Dowding, Keith, Robert E. Godin and Carole Pateman 2004. Justice and democracy: Essays for 
Brian Barry. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Ebenstein, William and Alan O. Ebenstein 1991. Great political thinkers: Plato to the present. 
Chicago, Holt, Reinhart and Winston.
England, Andrew 2006. Rwandan politics: Designed to avoid extremism. Financial Times, 
4 December 2006. 
Erie, Steven P. 1988. Rainbow’s end: Irish Americans and the dilemmas of urban political 
machines, 1840–1985. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Evans, Alison, Laure-Hélène Piron, Zaza Curran and Ruth Driscoll 2005. Independent 
evaluation of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002–2005 (PRSP1). Final Report 
February 20. London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Brighton, Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS).
Gardner, John W. 1990. On leadership. New York, Free Press. 
Greenstone, David J. and Paul E. Peterson 1973. Race and authority in urban politics. 
New York, Russell Sage Foundation.
Hayman, Rachel 2007. Milking the cow: Negotiating ownership of aid and policy in Rwanda. 
Global Economic Governance Programme (GEG). University College, Oxford. Working 
Paper 26.
Horowitz, Donald 1985. Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley, University of California.
Huyse, Luc and Mark Salter 2008. Traditional justice and reconciliation after violent conflict: 
Learning from African experiences. Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
Joseph, Richard 1997. Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and theoretical 
perspectives. Comparative Politics, 29 (3), pp. 363–382.
Kalu, Kelechi A. 2009. Resolving African crises. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9 (1), 
pp. 9–39.
Kanyarukiga, Sam, Esther van der Meer, Maria Paalman, Derek Poate and Ted Schrader 2006. 
Evaluation of DFID Country Program – Country study: Rwanda 2000–2005. London, 
Department for International Development (DFID).
Key, V.O. Jr. 1958. Politics, parties, and pressure groups. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell.
Koerner, Joellen Goertz and Sandra Schmidt Bunkers 1994. Transformational leadership: 
The power of symbol. In: Hein, Eleanor C. and M. Jean Nicholson eds. Contemporary 
leadership behavior: Selected readings. 4thedition.Philadelphia, Lippincott Publishing.
104
WallaceWarfieldandAshadSentongo
Kriesberg, Louis 2003. Constructive conflict resolution: From escalation to resolution. Oxford, 
Rowman and Littlefield.
Lederach, John P. 1995. Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse, 
Syracuse University Press.
Lederach, John Paul 1997. Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. 
Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.
Lerche, Charles O. 2000. Truth commissions and national reconciliation: Some reflections on 
theory and practice. Peace and Conflict Studies, 7 (1). 
Lijphart, Arend 1968. The politics of accommodation. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Lijphart, Arend 1977. Democracy in plural societies. A comparative exploration. New Haven, 
CT, Yale University.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1990. Continental divide: The values and institutions of the United States 
and Canada. New York, Routledge.
Mamdani, Mahmood 2001. When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the 
genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Nantulya, Paul and Karin Alexander 2005. Evaluation and impact assessment of the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). Final Report. Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation (IJR), December 2005. 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) 2008. Social cohesion in Rwanda: An 
opinion survey, Results 2005–2007. Kigali, NURC.
Powley, Elizabeth 2004. Strengthening governance: The role of women in Rwanda's transition –
 A summary. United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and 
Advancement of Women (OSAGI). Glen Cove, New York, United Nations.
Schumpeter, Joseph, A. 1950. Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. 3rd edition. New York, 
Harper and Row.
Tiemessen, Alana 2004. Rwandan Gacaca: Competing and collaborating for justice after 
genocide. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Available from: <http://www.
allacademic.com/meta/p74581_index.html>
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 2008. Rwandan women secure 
56% of parliamentary seats in historic election result. 22 September 2008. Available from: 
<http://www.unifem.org/news_events/story_detail.php?StoryID=736>
Webley, Radha 2004. Report on Rwanda. Berkeley, War Crimes Studies Center, University 
of California. 
Wilson, Edward O. 1998. Consilience: The unity of knowledge. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. 
Zartman, I. William 2000. Introduction: African traditional conflict medicine. In: Zartman, I. 
William ed. Traditional cures for modern conflicts: African conflict ‘medicine’. Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner.
